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POST-BANKRUPTCY TRANSFERS: AN OLD
PROBLEM IN NEED OF A
NEW SOLUTION
Hal M. Batemant
In order to achieve one of the basic policies of the Bankruptcy
Act'-the orderly, equitable distribution of the bankrupt's nonexempt
assets-it is necessary to fix a single point in time for reference in
determining both the property that comprises the bankruptcy estate
and the rights of the various interested parties. Yet, because subsequent transactions in the property thus identified as part of the estate
may occur before the trustee has actually reduced it to possession and
may involve the rights of third parties who act in good faith without
knowledge of the bankruptcy, it is equally necessary that adequate
and fair provision be made in the Act concerning post-bankruptcy
transfers.
These problems are now dealt with in sections 70a, 70d, and 21g
of the Bankruptcy Act. 2 Under section 70a the trustee is vested by
operation of law with the title of the bankrupt to specified types of
property as of the date the petition in bankruptcy is filed. But the
selection of the trustee and his taking possession of the property will
not actually occur until some later time. Meanwhile, the bankrupt
will often have possession or control of the property and may easily
deal with it as if he still has title. Under sections 70d and 21g,3 limited protection from liability to the trustee is extended to third persons who act without knowledge of the bankruptcy and either give
present value or discharge an existing obligation of the bankrupt.
But the decisions interpreting these sections have made it clear that
the scope of protection they afford is unduly restricted and should be
4
revised.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law (Columbia).
B.A. 1954, Rice University; LL.B. 1956, Southern Methodist University.
I Title 11, U.S.C. (1964). The short title, "Bankruptcy Act," was added by 64
Stat. 1113 (1950). Sections of the Bankruptcy Act will hereinafter be referred to in the
text by their customary numbers in the Act, rather than by the less familiar numbers
assigned to them in Title 11 of the United States Code.
2 11 U.S.C. §§ 110(a), 110(d), 44(g) (1964).
3 11 U.S.C. §§ 110(d), 44(g) (1964).
4 See, e.g., Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966), rev'g 352 F.2d 186 (9th
Cir. 1965); Feldman v. Capitol Piece Dye Works, Inc., 293 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. '948 (1961); Kohn v'. Myers, 266 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1959), aff'g In re Autocue Sales
& Distrib. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 218
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The recent case of Bank of Matin v. England5 dramatically illus-

trates the problem. Prior to bankruptcy the-bankrupt had drawn five
checks -on its 'commercial account with the Bank :6f Matin and'had
delivered them to the payee, Eureka Fisheries, Inc. A fetW weeks later
the bankrupt filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Six days thereafter Eureka Fisheries presented the checks for payment, and the"bank,
without notice or knowledge of the pending bankruptcy, paid them
in the ordinary course of business. Although a receiver had been appointed by the bankruptcy court when the petition was filed, he did
not notify the bank until the day after it had paid the checks. On
later being appointed trustee, he initiated turnover proceedings
against the bank and Eureka Fisheries to recover the amount paid
on the checks out of the bank account to which he had succeeded
under section 70a prior to the payment. The referee held the bank
and Eureka Fisheries jointly liable for the entire amount, which
Eureka Fisheries paid, demanding contribution from the bank. The
bank petitioned for review of the referee's order.
Both the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the decision of the referee. 6 They concluded that the
exclusive protection for post-bankruptcy transfers not involving real
property7 is that afforded by section 70d, and that the period during
which protection is available under that section ends with the adjudication of the bankrupt.8 Since section 18f, as amended in 1959, 9 pro-

vides that adjudication in voluntary proceedings occurs automatically
upon the filing of the petition, there is actually no period in such
proceedings during which innocent third parties are protected. Also,
in view of the prohibition in section 70d(5), the courts may not create
protection beyond that granted in sections 70d and 21g. Thus, the
bank had paid out funds belonging to the trustee without his authorization and was therefore liable to him for that amount.
Notwithstanding the strict logic of the Ninth Circuit's interpreF.2d 394 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955); Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank & Trust
Co., 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956).
5 385 U.S. 99 (1966), rev'g 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965).
6 Bank of Marin v. England, 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965).
7 Real property transfers are dealt with in § 21g and are therefore excluded from
the scope of § 70d.
8 The opening phrase of § 70d limits the availability of protection to the period"
"[a]fter bankruptcy and either before adjudication or before a receiver takes possession
of the property of the bankrupt, whichever first occurs." 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(d) (1964). Section 1(13) defines the date of bankuptcy as "the date when the
petition was filed." 52 Stat. 841 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1(13) (1964).
9 11 U.S.C. § 41(o (1964).
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tation of sections 70d and 18f, the Supreme Court granted certiorari'0
and reversed.1 ' The Court held that the trustee, like the bankrupt
to whose title he had succeeded, was bound by the bank's contractual
right to honor valid outstanding checks in the absence of a timely stop
payment order or some other reasonable and effective notice of the
trustee's rights. It concluded that, despite the apparent exclusiveness
of the protection afforded by section 70d, "[t]here is an overriding
consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction," and that this consideration warranted the avoidance of an obviously inequitable result. 12 A vigorous dissent by Mr.
Justice Harlan demonstrates that, although the result reached was
clearly desirable in this case, the precise basis of the decision is elusive
and difficult to reconcile with section 70d.13 As a result, the courts in
future cases must either adhere strictly to the provisions of section 70d,
notwithstanding obvious inequities, or extend protection beyond the
limitations of section 70d in implicit abrogation of the statute; and
they must act without any clear guide to resolution of the dilemma.
The only satisfactory solution to the resulting uncertainty is revision of
the statute to deal more adequately with the problem.
I
THE

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION

70d

Section 70d was added to the Bankruptcy Act by the Chandler
Act in 1938. Section 70a was being amended at that time to provide
that the trustee's title in the bankrupt's property is determined as of
the date the petition is filed. Because of that change in section 70a,
section 70d was added to provide protection for certain transactions
which might occur in the interval between filing the petition and the
earlier of adjudication of the bankrupt or possession of the estate by a
receiver or trustee. 14 The area of protection defined by the new section
10 Bank of Matin v. England, 383 U.S. 906 (1966).
11 Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
12 Id. at 103. In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Fortas reasoned that the case was
moot, since the trustee had been paid by Eureka Fisheries, whose claim against the bank
for contribution was not before the court.
1a Although Mr. Justice Harlan effectively criticized the majority opinion's departure
from § 70d on the basis of "equitable principles," he did not adequately answer the
bank's arguments based on its rights under the deposit contract and the lack of due
process in the absence of reasonable notice. See Notes, 31 Mo. L. REv. 565 (1966), 42
NoTRE DAME LAWYER 818 (1967), 15 U. KAN. L. REv. 100 (1966), 52 VA. L. Rav. 528
(1966). But see Note, 65 MIcHi. L. REv. 195 (1966).
14 11 U.S.C. § 110(d) (1964). The Chandler Act amendments are found at 52 Stat.

840-940 (1938).
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was intended to conform generally to the existing case law that had developed under the 1898 Act, but to provide greater consistency and
clarity than the decisions had afforded. 15 Hence, the situation that had
developed prior to 1938 is directly relevant to the structure of section
70d.
As originally enacted in 1898, section 70a provided that, upon
his appointment and qualification, the trustee
shall . . . be vested by operation of law with the title of the
bankrupt, as of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt [to six
broad categories of nonexempt property, including] . . . . (5)
property which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any

means have transferred or which might have been levied upon
and sold under judicial process against him .... 16
Thus, subject to the ambiguity posed by the reference to the date of
the petition in the fifth clause, the 1898 version of section 70a determined the trustee's title as of the date of adjudication, which occurred
17
only upon the actual entry of a decree by a bankruptcy court.
This aspect of the 1898 Act was in direct contrast to the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, which provided that the bankruptcy assignee,
elected by the creditors at their first meeting, received an assignment
from the judge or register 8 of the bankrupt's nonexempt property,
the effect of which related back to the time the petition was filed. 19
Although the 1867 Act contained no provision expressly protecting
innocent third persons during the interval between the petition and
the assignment, it did provide that upon adjudication of the bankrupt
the judge or register was to issue a warrant to the marshal
authorizing him forthwith, as messenger, to publish notices in
*

.

. newspapers [specified in the warrant or selected by the mar-

shal, and to give written notice to scheduled creditors and] . . .
to any person concerned as the warrant specifies [to the effect
that the warrant had issued and the first meeting of creditors had
been called, and] ... [t]hat the payment of any debts and delivery

of any property belonging to such debtor to him or for his use,

and the transfer of any property by him, are forbidden by law.20
15 See McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill To Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4
U. CH. L. REv. 369, 381-84 (1937). See also 4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
70.03[5],
70.66[1] (14th ed. 1964).
16 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 70a, 80 Stat. 565-66 (emphasis added).

Id. § 18g, at 551.
Under the nomenclature used in the 1867 Act the register served a function similar to that of the referee under the present Bankruptcy Act.
19 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, §§ 13, 14, 42, 14 Stat. 522, 537.
20 Id. §§ 11, 42, at 521-22, 537.
17
18
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In addition, the assignee was required to publish notice of his appointment weekly for three weeks and to record the assignment in the appropriate public records within six months. 21 Thus, the 1867 Act, like
the present act, dated the trustee's title from the filing of the petition,
but, unlike the present Act, it also provided some means for giving
22
notice of the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding to third parties.
Soon after the 1898 Act was adopted the Supreme Court decided
Mueller v. Nugent,23 which involved a question of the bankruptcy
court's summary jurisdiction rather than the rights of an innocent
third person in a post-bankruptcy transaction. But in its opinion the
Court made the sweeping declaration that:
It is as true of the present law as it was of that of 1867, that
the filing of the petition is a caveat to all the world, and in effect an
attachment and injunction, [International]Bank v. Sherman, 101
U.S. 403; and on adjudication, title to the bankrupt's property
became vested in the trustee, §§ 70, 21e, with actual or construcand placed in the custody of the bankruptcy
tive possession,
24
court.

As the Court later observed in York Manufacturing Co. v.
Cassell,25 this language concerning the effect of filing the petition was
merely dictum, stated in the limited context of the facts in Mueller v.
Nugent, and could not be applied literally in other situations without
became famous
qualification. Nevertheless, the caveat dictum quickly
26
decisions.
subsequent
innumerable
and was cited in
Id. §§ 14, 42, at 522-24, 537,
22 The relevant provisions of the two earlier bankruptcy acts should also be noted.
The Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, provided that the bankruptcy assignee's
title dated only from the time of the decree adjudicating the bankrupt but that the title
passed as of that date "by mere operation of law, ipso facto .... " The 1841 Act required
an actual decree of adjudication, id. § 1, at 440, but contained no provision dealing with
subsequent transfers by the bankrupt or the rights of transferees for value without notice.
The Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, §§ 5-7, 2 Stat. 23, provided only for involuntary proceedings and directed the bankruptcy commissioners, upon adjudication of the bankrupt, to
take possession of the bankrupt's property "forthwith" and assign it to the assignees
elected at the first meeting of creditors or appointed by the commissioners. This assignment was declared valid as against the bankrupt and all claiming under him through
transactions "at the time, or after [the bankrupt] shall have committed the act of bankruptcy, upon which the commission issued." Id. § 10, at 24. But the act expressly protected bona fide transferees for value without notice or knowledge of any act of bankruptcy, who purchased before the bankruptcy commission issued. Id.
21

23

184 U.S. 1 (1901).

24 Id. at 14. But cf. May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111, 117 (1925).
25 201 U.S. 344, 353 (1906); accord, In re Zotti, 186 F. 84, 85-86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
223 U.S. 718 (1911).
26 In 1937 Professor McLaughlin stated that the dictum had then been cited more
than 30 times by the Supreme Court and more than 300 times by the lower federal courts.

POST-BANKRUPTCY TRANSFERS

1968]

The original source of the caveat language was InternationalBank
v. Sherman,2 7 decided under the 1867 Act. That case, unlike Mueller
v. Nugent, had squarely involved the rights of post-petition transferees
under the 1867 Act provision that title passed to the trustee as of the
filing of the petition. The Supreme Court concluded that these provisions were clear and mandatory and that subsequent transfers were
necessarily invalid against the trustee.28 But the transferees in Sherman,
unlike those in Bank of Marin v. England, had been fully aware of
the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding and of the bankrupt's
29
insolvency at the time of the transfer.
Following the decision in Mueller v. Nugent, both aspects of the
problem presented by the ambiguity in section 70a of the 1898 Act
arose: (1) whether the trustee had title to the estate during the interval
between filing and adjudication; and (2) if so, whether innocent transferees from the bankrupt during that interval would be protected
against liability to the trustee. For several years there was uncertainty
on the matter.30 In Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co.,31
the Supreme Court concluded, on the basis of the caveat dictum and
the general importance of the date of filing in the 1898 Act, that,
after the filing of the petition, the bankrupt's property is in custodia
legis pending adjudication of the bankrupt and therefore is not subject to levy of attachment or garnishment by a creditor.3 2 Sixteen
months later the Court finally resolved the matter in Everett v.
Judson,33 in which it concluded:
We think that the purpose of the law was to fix the line of
cleavage with reference to the condition of the bankrupt estate as
the time at which the petition was filed and that the property
which vests in the trustee at the time of adjudication is that
which the bankrupt owned at the time of the filing of the
petition. 34
Accordingly, the Court held that the trustee's rights in the bankrupt's
McLaughlin, supra note 15, at 382 n.58. The caveat dictum has not since lost its popularity.
27 101 U.S. 403 (1879).
28

Id. at 406.

29 Id. at 407.
80 See Johnson v. Collier, 222 U.S. 538 (1912); In re Zotti, 186 F. 84 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 223 U.S. 718 (1911).
31 222 U.S. 300 (1911).
32 Id. at 306-08; see Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913).
33 228 U.S. 474 (1913). See also Andrews v. Partridge, 228 U.S. 479 (1913), decided
the same day.
34 228 U.S. at 479.
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life insurance policies were determined as of the date the petition had
been filed, notwithstanding the subsequent death of the bankrupt
prior to adjudication. 35
Had the courts applied this principle consistently to all postpetition transactions, the result would have been an extremely harsh
application of the doctrine of lis pendens, based merely on the filing
of a bankruptcy petition. Fortunately, this was avoided. Since the
courts had created the relation-back doctrine to resolve an inherent
ambiguity in section 70a, they were equally free to develop exceptions
to the rule when necessary to avoid inequitable results. But because
the relation-back rule concerned only the period between the filing
and the adjudication, the exceptions developed by the courts also focused on that period. Yet this limitation on the context of the exceptions resulted ultimately from nothing more than the structure of the
ambiguity in section 70a.
Since the courts developed the exceptions to the relation-back
rule largely on an ad hoc basis, they failed to provide any consistent
or clear set of principles for determining the availability of protection
in post-petition transactions. 36 Certain situations did emerge, however,
in which protection was granted or denied with some predictability.
Post-petition preferences, 37 fraudulent transfers, 38 and liens obtained
by legal or equitable proceedings 9 were usually invalidated. Also, if
the post-petition transferee knew of the pending bankruptcy at the
time of the transfer "° or did not give present value, 41 he took subject
35 Under the proviso following § 70a(5) the trustee can, in effect, reach the cash
surrender value or its equivalent in policies on the life of the bankrupt. Under the
terms of an ordinary life policy, such value would exist on the date the petition is
filed but would cease to exist upon the death of the insured bankrupt prior to adjudication. Hence, if the trustee's title vests as of the date of adjudication, he takes nothing;
but if it vests as of the date of filing, he can recover the cash surrender value existing
at that time. Cf. Fairbanks Steam Shovel Co. v. Wills, 240 U.S. 642 (1916), citing Everett
v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474 (1913), and Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222
U.S. 300 (1911).
36 See In re Scranton Knitting Mills, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. Pa. 1937); 4 W.
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
70.66 (14th ed. 1964); McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy
Act, 40 HARV. L. Rav. 583, 612-16 (1927).
37 Grand Rapids Dry Goods Co. v. Ostendorf, 6 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1925); Reed v.
Barnett Nat'l Bank, 250 F. 983 (5th Cir. 1918); In re R & W Skirt Co., 222 F. 256 (2d
Cir. 1915); cf. In re Perpall, 271 F. 466 (2d Cir. 1921).
38 May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111 (1925); In re Denson, 195 F. 854 (N.D. Ala. 1912);
cf. Grand Rapids Dry Goods Co. v. Otsendorf, 6 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1925).
39 Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300 (1911).
4t0May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111 (1925); In re Denson, 195 F. 854 (N.D. Ala. 1912).
41 Cf. May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111 (1925); Fairbanks Steam Shovel Co. v. Wills,
240 U.S. 642 (1916); In re R & IV Skirt Co., 222 F. 256 (2d Cir. 1915).
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to the trustee's rights. On the other hand, the courts usually protected
good-faith transferees who gave present value after the petiftion had
been filed.42 Also, to enable a person against whom an involuntary
petition had been filed to continue his business until adjudication or
possession by a receiver, transactions with the bankrupt after the filing
and in the ordinary course of business were usually upheld.43
Trustees frequently raised the question whether a bank was liable
for the balance on deposit in the bankrupt's account as of the date of
filing even though the bank had subsequently honored checks drawn
by the bankrupt and presented in the ordinary course of business.
The courts consistently held that, where the bank had acted in good
faith without actual notice of the bankruptcy and pursuant to the
terms of the deposit contract, it was not liable to the trustee. 44
Since most of the cases granting exceptions to the relation-back
rule involved only the period prior to adjudication, some courts were
led to assert in dicta that after adjudication no transfer by the bankrupt could be valid against the trustee. 45 Apparently, however, it was
never so held; and in two cases the Supreme Court actually granted
protection to transfers that had occurred after adjudication, although
the significance of the fact that adjudication had occurred does not
46
appear to have been urged or considered in either case.
42 In re Perpall, 271 F. 466 (2d Cir. 1921); In re Latex Drilling Co., 11 F.2d 373
(W.D. La. 1926).
43 Hersh v. United States, 68 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1934); In re Retail Stores Delivery
Corp., 11 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); In re Latex Drilling Co., 11 F.2d 373 (W.D. La.
1926). See also In re Mertens, 144 F. 818 (2d Cir. 1906).
44 Citizens' Union Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 286 F. 527 (6th Cir. 1923); In re Zotti, 186
F. 84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 718 (1911); In re Retail Stores Delivery Corp., 11
F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); cf. In re Fuller, 294 F. 71 (2d Cir. 1923). In an analogous
case the bankrupt died more than 3 months after the petition was filed. The life
insurance company, without notice of the pending bankruptcy, paid the proceeds due
under the policy to the named beneficiary. The insurance company was- held not liable
to the trustee for the cash surrender value of the policy at the date the petition was filed.
Frederick v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 U.S. 395 (1921).
45 See, e.g., J.S. & J.F. String, Inc. v. Birkhahn, 30 F.2d 492, 495 (3d Cir. 1929);
Southern Ry. v. Cole, 49 Ga. App. 635, 176 S.E. 512 (1934).
46 In Frederick v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 U.S. 395 (1921), an insurer had
paid the proceeds of the bankrupt's life insurance policy to the named beneficiary on
May 7, 1913, following the insured's death on April 4, 1913. The insurer had no notice
of the bankruptcy, although the adjudication had occurred on January 8, 1913, pursuant
to a petition filed on December 19, 1912. The Court held that the insurer had discharged
its duties under the policy in good faith and was not liable to the trustee. In Jones v.
Springer, 226 U.S. 148 (1912), the bankruptcy petition was filed on March 12, 1906, and
the adjudication followed on April 23. A creditor had attached property of the bankrupt
in a state court proceeding on February 27. The state court ordered sale on May 1, and
its receiver sold the property to an innocent purchaser for value on June 26. The Court
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II

THE 1938 AMENDMENTS-SECTIONS 70a, 70d, AND 21g
Among the extensive amendments of the Bankruptcy Act in 193847
were the revision of section 70a and the addition of the present sections
70d and 21g. Acting in the light of the existing patterns in the law
and with a desire to remedy only its obvious inadequacies, Congress
was largely influenced by the form of the existing situation.
First, Congress clarified the ambiguity in section 70a concerning
the time as of which the trustee's title vests and the assets of the estate
are identified. In accord with the relation-back rule, the opening clause
of section 70a was revised to provide that the trustee, upon his appointment and qualification, is "vested by operation of law with the
title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition ....,,4s
This was intended to remedy what the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees both regarded as "a very serious defect" 49 in the 1898 Act.
The House Judiciary Committee considered the problem to be particularly acute "in the administration of cases in which the adjudi50
cation is contested."
Due to the drastic consequence this change would have, under
the caveat principle, for innocent third persons involved in postbankruptcy transactions, sections 21g and 70d were added to the Act
to provide an affirmative grant of protection in certain cases. Transactions in real property were dealt with in section 21g and transactions
in all other property were covered by section 70d. 51 In granting proheld that the sale was valid as against the trustee, since the state court and the parties
had been unaware of the pending bankruptcy and the property had been in the custody
of the state court when bankruptcy began. It does not appear in either of these cases
that the fact of the bankrupt's adjudication prior to the transfer was regarded as foreclosing the possibility of protection for the transfer.
47 52 Stat. 840 (1938). These amendments are known as the Chandler Act and are
codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.
48 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § ll0a (1964) (emphasis added).
49 S. REP. No. 1916 (Judiciary Comm.), 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 18 (1938); H.R. REP. No.
1409 (Judiciary Comm.), 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1937). Both reports accompanied the
Chandler Bill, H.R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
50 H.R. REP. No. 1409, supra note 49, at 34.
51 Section 70d reads:
After bankruptcy and either before adjudication or before a receiver takes
possession of the property of the bankrupt, whichever first occurs(1) A transfer of any of the property of the bankrupt, other than real
estate, made to a person acting in good faith shall be valid against the trustee
if made for a present fair equivalent value or, if not made for a present fair
equivalent value, then to the extent of the present consideration actually paid
therefor, for which amount the transferee shall have a lien upon the property
so transferred;
(2) A person indebted to the bankrupt or holding property of the bankrupt
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tection in specified situations, Congress was guided by, and intended
substantially to follow, the judicially-created exceptions to the relation52
back rule.
Two basic types of post-bankruptcy transfers are dealt with separately in clauses (1) and (2) of section 70d. Clause (1) provides protection for the good-faith transferee of the bankrupt's property to
the extent that he gives "present fair equivalent value" for the property received. The key requirement of "present fair equivalent value"
implicitly excludes from protection the preference, the fraudulent
53
transfer, and the judicial lien.
Under clause (2), debtors of the bankrupt and persons holding
his property are protected if in good faith they pay the debt or deliver
the property to the bankrupt or on his order after the petition has
been filed and title has vested in the trustee. This protects a bank that
pays a check against the bankrupt's account, an insurance company
that pays under the bankrupt's policy, a bailee of the bankrupt's propmay, if acting in good faith, pay such indebtedness or deliver such property,
or any part thereof, to the bankrupt or upon his order, with the same effect
as if the bankruptcy were not pending;
(3) A person having actual knowledge of such pending bankruptcy shall
be deemed not to act in good faith unless he has reasonable cause to believe
that the petition in bankruptcy is not well founded;
(4) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subdivision shall not
apply where a receiver or trustee appointed by a United States or State court
is in possession of all or the greater portion of the nonexempt property of the
bankrupt;
(5) A person asserting the validity of a transfer under this subdivision shall
have the burden of proof. Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision and
in subdivision g of section 21 of this Act, no transfer by or in behalf of the
bankrupt after the date of bankruptcy shall be valid against the trustee: Provided, however, that nothing in this Act shall impair the negotiability of
currency or negotiable instruments.
Bankruptcy Act § 70d, 52 Stat. 881-82 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110d (1964).
52 See S. RxrP. No. 1916, supra note 49; H.R. REP. No. 1409, supra note 49; HousE
JUDICIARY ComM=rrrE, ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 229-31 (1936) [hereinafter cited as ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889]. Section 70d, like much of the Chandler Act, was
primarily the result of the extensive work of the National Bankruptcy Conference, the
history of which is described in H.R. REP. No. 1409, supra note 49, at 1-3. Professor James
A. McLaughlin was the principal proponent and draftsman of § 70d itself. In 1927 he
had suggested a provision based on § 45 of the English Bankruptcy Act of 1914. McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARv. L. Rav. 583, 615-16 (1927). As a
member of the Conference he was closely involved in the development of § 70d as finally
enacted in 1938. The Chandler Bill was introduced in the 74th Congress as H.R. 12889 two
years before its enactment in 1938. ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889 contains detailed comments
by members of the National Bankruptcy Conference on each section of the Chandler
Bill and furnishes valuable insight into the legislative intent at many points. With these
comments at hand, the committee reports dealt briefly with many new provisions such as
§ 70d. See McLaughlin, supra note 15.
53 Cf. cases cited notes 37-39 supra.
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erty who delivers it as directed, and a trade account debtor of the
54
bankrupt who pays his account to the bankrupt.

Although "good faith" is not fully defined, clause (3)provides
that "actual knowledge of [the] pending bankruptcy" precludes one
from being in good faith for the purposes of section 70d "unless he
has reasonable cause to believe that the petition in bankruptcy is not
well founded." The latter qualification, which evidently could relate
only to involuntary proceedings, was intended primarily to protect
debtors engaged in business from harassment by ill-founded petitions,
and to enable them to continue doing business pending a judicial
determination on the petition.55
Clause (5) places the burden of proof on the party claiming protection under section 70d and provides that "nothing in this Act shall
impair the negotiability of currency or negotiable instruments."
Although the exact meaning of the latter provision is obscure, its purpose was apparently to avoid any interference with negotiable instruments law.56
The opening phrase of section 70d sharply limits the availability
of protection in the situations defined in clauses (1) and (2) to the
period "[a]fter bankruptcy and either before adjudication or before
a receiver takes possession of the property of the bankrupt, whichever
first occurs." Also, clause (4) denies protection under clauses (1) and
(2) "where a receiver or trustee appointed by a United States or State
court is in possession of all or the greater portion of the nonexempt
property of the bankrupt."
The intended relationship between the two references to possession by a receiver is unclear, but four facts support the conclusion
that, read together, these provisions terminate the protected interval
whenever any receiver is in possession of the greater portion of the
bankrupt's nonexempt property. First, since the provisions serve only
to define the end of the protected interval, only the event that will
necessarily occur first is material. Second, before a receiver can possess
all of the bankrupt's property, he must necessarily possess the greater
portion of it. Third, since possession by a receiver of all of the property would prevent a post-bankruptcy transfer, only possession of the
54 Cf. cases cited note 44 supra.
55 See J. MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 298 (1956); cf. cases cited note 43 supra.
56 See Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956);
70.68, at 1502 n.3 (14th ed. 1964); Note, Bankruptcy and
4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
Negotiable Instruments, 64 HARV. L. Rv. 958 (1951); cf. Seligson, Creditors' Rights, 32
N.Y.U.L. Ruv. 708, 729-31 (1957); Note, 70 HARV. L. RIv. 548 (1957).
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greater portion of the property is relevant to section 70d. Finally, in
the absence of any definition in the act of the term "receiver," 57 it
should be construed to include both bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy
receivers both in the opening phrase of section 70d and in clause (4).58
The combined effect of the opening clause of section 70d and
clause (4) is to end the interval.during which protection for transactions within clauses (1) and (2) is possible upon the earlier of two
events: (1) the adjudication of the bankrupt, or (2) possession of the
greater portion of his nonexempt property by a receiver or trustee.
Neither of these events bears any logical relationship to the position
or rights of innocent third persons involved in the post-bankruptcy
transactions described in clauses (1) and (2). The legislative history and
background of section 70d do not reveal that any serious, critical
consideration was given to the propriety of terminating protection
prior to receipt by the third party of actual notice of the bankruptcy or actual possession of the particular property in question by
a receiver or trustee. It does not appear that the soundness of either
terminal event was separately weighed on its merits or that Congress
had any considered intent to prohibit all possibility of protection for
a transfer after either event. 59 Rather, in concentrating on the affirmative creation of a clear, predictable area of protection along the lines
indicated by the prior cases, Congress inadvertently perpetuated in
section 70d the limitations on the protected interval suggested by those
cases. Since the relation-back rule itself pertained only to the period
between filing the petition and adjudication, the exceptions created
by the courts were similarly restricted to the pre-adjudication period, 60
and some of the cases had suggested the limitation based on possession
by a receiver during that period.6 1
These restrictions on protection are reinforced by the provision
in clause (5) that, except as otherwise provided in sections 70d and
57 Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 1(31), 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.c. § 1(31), which does not
define "receiver," but merely provides that the term "shall indude all of the receivers
of an estate."
58 No distinction between the two was recognized in Lake v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 218 F.2d 394 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955), which held that dause (4)
applied to the bankruptcy receiver. A different interpretation, recognizing a distinction,
has been suggested. 4 W. COLMER, BANKRUPrCY
70.68, at 1504 n.9 (14th ed. 1964).
59 Cf. S. REl. No. 1916, supra note 49; H.R. REP. No. 1409, supra note 49; ANALYsis
OF H.R. 12889, supra note 52; McLaughlin, supra note 15, at 381-84, 401-02.
60 The only two exceptions found were Frederick v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
256 U.S. 395 (1921), and Jones v. Springer, 226 U.S. 148 (1912). In neither case was the
post-adjudication feature stressed. The cases are discussed in note 46 supra.
61 See cases cited note 43 supra.
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21g, "no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of
bankruptcy shall be valid against the trustee." Congress's primary concern was to guarantee that protection would be forthcoming in the
situations defined in sections 70d and 21g, and thus to eliminate prior
uncertainties about whether a court would grant protection in each
particular case. Toward this end, Congress sought to take the matter
out of the domain of judicial discretion and place it under the exclusive control of the statute. This provision, however, does not appear
to have been motivated by any desire to prohibit protection after the
period covered by section 70d. 62 Yet, this has been the chief use of the
63
prohibition in the cases that have arisen under section 70d.

Section 21g, dealing with post-petition transfers of the bankrupt's
real estate, was also added in 1938.64 Although the section was new,
its substance and approach were derived from the former section 2le
and certain problems that had arisen thereunder. The former section
2le had provided that a certified copy of the order approving the
trustee's bond constituted conclusive evidence that title had vested in
him and that, if recorded, the order imparted the same notice of the
trustee's title as would be imparted by a recorded deed from the
bankrupt to the trustee. 65
The decisions under the former sections 70a and 2le had consistently held that the vesting of title in the trustee was not in derogation
of local recording acts. Thus, unless the notice provision of section
21e had been utilized, an innocent purchaser of realty from the bankrupt could prevail under the local recording acts against the trustee. 66
But since section 21e based notice only on the recorded order approving the trustee's bond, which could be entered by the court only after
adjudication of the bankrupt and qualification of the trustee, the estate
62 Cf. ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, supra note 52, at 229-31; McLaughlin, supra note 15,
at 383-84.
63 See cases cited note 4 supra.
64 11 U.S.C. § 44g (1964).
65 Section 21e then read:
A certified copy of the order approving the bond of a trustee shall constitute
conclusive evidence of the vesting in him of the title to the property of the bankrupt, and if recorded shall impart the same notice that a deed from the
bankrupt to the trustee if recorded would have imparted had not bankruptcy
proceedings intervened.
Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 21e, 30 Stat. 552.
66 Beach v. Faust, 2 Cal. 2d 290, 40 P.2d 822 (1935); Vombrack v. Wavra, 331 In.
508, 163 N.E. 340 (1928); Derryberry v. Matterson, 193 La. 624, 192 So. 78 (1939). See also
the discussion in Vierson v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133, 139 (Okla. 1963) (dissenting opinion).
The doctrine of Us pendens could create an exception in some cases when the realty was
situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
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was left unprotected against dissipation of the bankrupt's realty prior
67
to that point in the proceeding.
Intending to-deal with this problem, 6 Congress provided in the
new section 21g that the petition, without the schedules, the decree of
adjudication, or the order approving the trustee's bond, might be recorded by the trustee, the referee, or any interested party, and that
any such recording would constitute notice to third parties of the
trustee's title. In addition, express provision was made to protect innocent purchasers for value in the absence of such recording. Curiously,
however, a concluding proviso in section 21g was added to limit application of the section to counties other than that in which the bankruptcy is pending, apparently leaving local realty to the operation of
69
the local recording statutes and rules of lis pendens.
Unlike the approach taken in section 70d, nothing in section 21g
terminates the protection granted innocent purchasers of realty prior
to the actual recording of the required notice. No suggestion seems
to have been made in the drafting and enactment of section 21g that
protection should be denied with respect to post-adjudication transfers, as was being done in section 70d.70 But this aspect of section 21g67 See Vierson v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133, 139 (Okla. 1963) (dissenting opinion);
ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, supra note 52, at 130-31.
68 Vierson v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133, 139 (Okla. 1963) (dissenting opinion); ANALYSIS
OF H.R. 12889, supra note 52, at 130-31.
69 Section 21g reads:
A certified copy of the petition with the schedules omitted, of the decree of
the adjudication or of the order approving the trustee's bond may be recorded
at any time in the office where conveyances of real property are recorded, in

every county where the bankrupt owns or has an interest in real property. Such
certified copy may be recorded by the bankrupt, trustee, receiver, custodian,
referee, or any creditor, and the cost of such recording shall be paid out of the
estate of the bankrupt as part of the expenses of administration. Unless a certified copy of the petition, decree, or order has been recorded in such office, in
any county wherein the bankrupt owns or has an interest in real property in
any State whose laws authorize such recording, the commencement of a proceeding under this Act shall not be constructive notice to or affect the title of
any subsequent bona-fide purchaser or lienor of real property in such county
for a present fair equivalent value and without actual notice of the pendency
of such proceeding: Provided, however, That where such purchaser or lienor
has given less than such value, he shall nevertheless have a lien upon such
property, but only to the extent of the consideration actually given by him.
The exercise by any court of the United States or of any State of jurisdiction
to authorize or effect a judicial sale of real property of the bankrupt within
any county in any State whose laws authorize the recording aforesaid shall not
be impaired by the pendency of such proceeding unless such copy be recorded
in such county, as aforesaid, prior to the consummation of such judicial sale:
Provided, however, That this subdivision shall not apply to the county in which
is kept the record of the original proceedings under this Act.
Bankruptcy Act § 21g, 52 Stat. 858 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 44(g) (1964).
70 Cf. S. REP. No. 1916, supra note 49; H.R. R E. No. 1409, supra note 49; ANALYSIS

OF H.R. 12889, supra note 52, at 130-31.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:280

allowing protection after adjudication-like the contrary provision in
section 70d, seems to have resulted primarily from the uncritical
acceptance of the form of the previous situation.
III
THE 1959 AMENDMENT-SECTION 18F
Until 1959 the adjudication of the debtor as a bankrupt pursuant
to either a voluntary or an involuntary petition could only occur upon
the affirmative entry of an order to that effect by a United States district judge or a referee.71 Thus, it was somewhat plausible to treat
such an order as a judicial act of sufficient dignity and notoriety to
impart constructive notice of its occurrence and consequences, although to do so constituted a rather sweeping application of the concept of lis pendens. It is reasonably probable that the adjudication in
a contested involuntary proceeding will attain at least local notoriety.
But for many years prior to 1959 the entry of the adjudication order
in voluntary proceedings was essentially a matter of routine, occurring
promptly after the filing of the petition and receiving virtually no
public attention.7 2 Nevertheless, since an actual court order was necessary to effect the adjudication in every case, some interval of time was
assured between the filing of the petition and the entry of the order.
In 1959, however, Congress amended section 18f to provide that
"[t]he filing of a voluntary petition under chapters I to VII of this Act
. . . shall operate as an adjudication with the same force and effect
as a decree of adjudication."7 3 Thus, in voluntary cases the "adjudication" became a fiction based on the mere ex parte filing of the petition, without further notoriety or judicial act. The legislative history
of this amendment clearly establishes that its sole purpose was to simplify and expedite the handling of bankruptcy cases and to achieve
greater administrative efficiency.7 4 This purpose was commendable,
and in this respect the amendment has proven highly effective and
workable.
71 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 18g, 52 Stat. 852. Section 18g was renumbered

§ 18f by the 1949 amendment, and the former § 18f was repealed. 73 Stat. 109 (1959). The
adjudication order was normally signed by the judge. See J. MACLACHLAN, supra note
55, § 49.
72 See S. REP. No. 320, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
73 Bankruptcy Act § 18f, 73 Stat. 109 (1959), 11 U.S.C. § 41(f) (1964).
74 See S. REP. No. 320, supra note 72; H.R. REP. No. 241, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
This amendment was coupled with an amendment to § 22 to provide for automatic
reference of cases to a referee "[u]nless the judge or judges direct otherwise ..
Bankruptcy Act § 22a, 73 Stat. 109 (1959), 11 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964).
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Congress evidently failed, however, to take into account all the
consequences of the linguistic formula it used to achieve this end.
At no point in the drafting, consideration,, and enactment of this
amendment does it appear to have been recognized that in voluntary
proceedings the amendment would have the effect of eliminating all
protection under section 70d for innocent third parties involved in
post-bankruptcy transactions, although this result appears logically
75
inevitable.

IV
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 70d

Although section 70d was enacted primarily to provide affirmative
protection for innocent third parties involved in post-bankruptcy
transactions, the leading decisions under it have principally concerned
the rigid limitations on the protection created. Until the Supreme
Court's decision in Bank of Matin v. England,76 most of the cases had
interpreted the section's prohibition against judicial interference with
the defined area of protection 77 as forbidding the granting of protection
in other situations, equitable considerations notwithstanding. 78 Bank
of Marin v. England stands as the major exception to this trend.
Although the case fails to provide a satisfactory solution to the problem, it demonstrates the inherent narrowness and unreasonableness
of the limitations in section 70d on the protected interval.
The opinion in Lake v. New York Life Insurance Co. 79 was the
first major interpretation of section 70d. The bankrupt had been insured by five life insurance companies. On August 6, 1951, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against him and a receiver was
appointed. At the time the aggregate cash surrender value of the policies was $45,702.44. By August 21 the receiver had taken possession
of all or the greater portion of the bankrupt's known assets, but he
did not then know of the existence of the life insurance policies.
Between August 21 and August 29, the five insurance companies, un75 S. REP. No. 820, supra note 72; H.R. REP. No. 241, supra note 74; cf. Bank of
Matin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 109 n.16 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
77 The prohibition is contained in clause (5) of § 70d, quoted in note 51 supra.
78 Feldman v. Capital Piece Dye Works, Inc., 293 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 948 (1961); Kohn v. Myers, 266 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1959), aff'g In re Autocue Sales &
Distrib. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 218 F.2d
394 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955). But see Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank &
Trust Co., 189 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956). The Ninth Circuit and Mr. Justice Harlan,
in his dissent in Bank of Marin, also adhered to the strict interpretation of § 70d.
79 218 F.2d 394 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955).
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aware of the pending bankruptcy, made loans to the bankrupt aggregating. $45,334.28, and secured repayment by taking contemporaneous
assignments of the policies from the bankrupt.
Adjudication of the bankrupt occurred on September 24, and the
trustee first discovered the existence of the policies on October 29.
By that time, however, the bankrupt had used most of the borrowed
money to pay various creditors. The portion remaining was recovered
by the trustee. Pursuant to section 70a(5) the trustee gave the bankrupt
the option to remit the balance of the cash surrender value of the
policies as of August 6. On the bankrupt's failure to do so, the trustee
brought suit against the insurance companies for the cash surrender
value of the policies as of August 6, less the portion of the loans already recovered by the trustee. The insurance companies defended
on the ground that they held valid security assignments of the policies,
taken by them in good faith without knowledge of the pending bankruptcy to secure contemporaneous loans to the bankrupt.8 0 They argued that their liability should therefore be limited to the cash
surrender value of the policies less the balance due on the loans. The
trustee replied that at the time of the loans the bankruptcy receiver
had been in possession of the greater portion of the bankrupt's property, and that the security assignments were therefore beyond the
scope of the protection afforded by section 70d.
The Fourth Circuit, reversing the district court's decision, sustained the trustee's argument on this issue."' In an opinion by Judge
Soper, often cited for its interpretation of section 70d, the court reviewed the history of the treatment of post-bankruptcy transfers culminating in the enactment of section 70d, and concluded:
It is obvious that the intent of this enactment is to invalidate
transactions not granted specific protection under the Act and
thus put to an end the confusion theretofore existing in the decisions. There is almost always some injustice or hardship which
attends transactions occurring after the filing of a petition in bankruptcy between the bankrupt, acting wrongfully, and an innocent
third person, because the loss must fall either upon the third
person or upon the creditors of the bankrupt. Whether the line
which has been drawn is the best possible solution of the problem
is not for the courts to say. The line has in fact been drawn by
80 In addition to the principal defense urged and discussed here, the defendants
urged defenses of election of remedies in recovery of part of the fund, and of estoppel
by benefit to the estate through satisfaction of creditors' claims with the fund. These
defenses were also rejected by the court.
81 Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 394 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917
(1955), rev'g 122 F. Supp. 348 (D. Md. 1954).
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competent authority and it is no longer necessary for the courts

to make the attempt, which has not been conspicuously successful
in the past, to decide cases on the facts as they arise and to draw
a fine distinction between transactions
which should be protected
82
and those which should not.

Accordingly, the court held that under section 70d(4) protection for
transactions described in sections 70d(l) and (2) had ceased to be available when the receiver took possession of most of the bankrupt's assets
on August 21, and that section 70d(5) prohibited the extension of any
protection thereafter. The later security assignments of the policies
to the insurance companies were, therefore, held to be ineffective
against the trustee's title to the policies under section 70a(5).
A similar contention was made by the trustee in Rosenthal v.
Guaranty Bank and Trust Co.s3 The bankrupt had filed a petition in
the Southern District of New York for reorganization under Chapter
X,8 4 which the court approved on October 3, 1951. The trustee was
appointed on October 5, and on October 11 he notified the defendant
bank in Lafayette, Louisiana, where the bankrupt had its principal
checking account, that the reorganization proceeding was pending.
Between October 4 and October 10, however, the bank, in honoring
checks previously issued by the bankrupt, had paid the $6,699.91 balance that was on deposit in the account at the close of business on
October 3. On June 7, 1954, the court adjudicated the debtor a bankrupt and directed that straight bankruptcy be proceeded with.
The trustee brought suit against the bank to recover the $6,699.91
on the theory that the order approving the reorganization petition on
October 3 amounted to an "adjudication" within the meaning of section 70d, and that the bank's payment of the checks between October
4 and October 10 was therefore beyond the scope of the protection
afforded. The trustee relied on the prohibition expressed in section
70d(5) as precluding the grant of any further protection.8 5
The court was "inclined to agree"8 6 with the trustee's strict interpretation of the prohibition in section 70d(5), but pointed out that
82 Id. at 399.
83 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956).

84 Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-276, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1964).
85 The trustee also contended that the bank had knowledge of the pending reorganization proceeding from its awareness of newspaper accounts and rumors which indicated
major difficulty but were not specific concerning the pending proceeding. The court
concluded that this did not give the bank "actual knowledge" within the meaning of
§ 70d(3) and that the bank had no such knowledge until the notification on October 11,
1951.
86 139 F. Supp. at 734.
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the section also contained an exception from this prohibition for
transactions involving the "negotiability of currency or negotiable
instruments.' 's Observing the acute dilemma faced by a bank when
its depositor's status is uncertain-having to choose between liability
to the depositor for dishonoring valid checks (if bankruptcy has not
occurred) and liability to the trustee for honoring checks (if bankruptcy has occurred)-the court concluded that the negotiability exception was intended to prevent the Bankruptcy Act from interfering
with the normal handling of negotiable instruments in the absence of
actual knowledge that bankruptcy is pending. 88 Therefore, the bank
was held to be protected.
The strict interpretation of section 70d was accepted in Kohn v.
Myers,8 9 with full recognition of its possible harshness. A competitor
of the bankrupt and the competitor's attorney purchased $16,987.57
of the bankrupt's accounts receivable for $16,817.49 while an involuntary petition against the bankrupt was pending, but prior to adjudication. The competitor and its attorney knew that the bankruptcy was
pending and that the first two pleadings by the petitioner were defective. They did not know, however, that a second amendment to the
petition, curing the defects in the prior pleadings, had been filed by
the time of their purchase. After adjudication the trustee brought a
summary proceeding against the competitor and its attorney for return
of the accounts receivable or their proceeds. Among the disputed issues
was whether the competitor and its attorney had acted in "good faith"
within the meaning of section 70d(3).
Both the district court and the Second Circuit held that the competitor and its attorney had not acted in "good faith" because, knowing
of the first two pleadings, they were charged with knowledge of the
third, which supplied the curative amendment. Hence, they did not
have "reasonable cause to believe that the petition [was]

. . .

not well

founded"90 at the time of the purchase.
52 Stat. 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § l10(d)(5) (1964). See note 51 supra.
This interpretation of the "negotiability proviso" has been criticized by several
authors on the ground that presentment of a check for payment is not a "negotiation"
of it in the strict sense of negotiable instruments law and, therefore, not within the
"negotiability proviso." See 4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
70.68, at 1502 n.3 (14th ed.
1964); Seligson, Creditors' Rights, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 708, 729-31 (1957); Note, 70 HARV. L.
REv. 548 (1957); cf. Note, Bankruptcy and Negotiable Instruments, 64 HARv. L. REV. 958
(1951).
89 266 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1959), af'g In re Autocue Sales & Distrib. Corp., 162 F. Supp.
17 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
90 Bankruptcy Act § 70d(3), 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § l10(d)(3) (1964).
87
88
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In the district court opinion, Judge Dimock ably described the
rigidity and harshness of section 70d:
It is not to be wondered that petitioners go to extremes in
an attempt to find some amelioration of the extraordinarily arbitrary provisions of the statute. There seems to be no escape from
the fact that, even though the transferees gave more than adequate
consideration for the accounts receivable transferred to them and
the bankrupt used this consideration for the payment of taxes and
wage claims, the transferees must now reassign the accounts receivable or their proceeds without the benefit of the return of the
consideration to which they would be entitled upon conventional
recission of the transaction. Petitioners put the case of a department store against which a petition in bankruptcy has been filed
with resulting publicity in the newspapers. Business continues
as usual and a customer who has read of the proceedings but has
no views as to their validity buys an overcoat and pays $100 for it.
The store is later declared bankrupt and the trustee brings a summary proceeding for the return of the overcoat. Under the Referee's construction of the statute the trustee is entitled to the
return of the ovcercoat but need not return the $100 that was
paid for it. Such a statute would seem to be calculated to put a
stop to any business as soon as a petition in bankruptcy was filed
against it. Nevertheless, I see no escape from that construction
of the Bankruptcy Act. 91
Concurring in this interpretation of section 70d, the Second Circuit
stated:
The policy of the statute is to place a rigid and absolute ban
on all transfers and even as to the exceptions specifically mentioned in [section 70d(l)] .. .the transferee has the burden of
proof. The period between the filing of the petition and adjudication is a sensitive and important period. Any contrary policy
would render it very difficult, if not impossible, for the trustee to
liquidate or dispose of the bankrupt's property most advantageously. 92
The Second Circuit adhered to this view of section 70d in Feld-

man v. Capitol Piece Dye Works, Inc. 93 The bank honored the bankrupt's payroll checks against its account after an involuntary petition
had been filed, but prior to adjudication. Although the bank acted
without knowledge of the bankruptcy, it was held liable to the trustee
91 162 F. Supp. at 22-23.
92 266 F.2d at 357.
93 293 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 868 U.S. 948 (1961). See also Schilling v.
McAllister Bros., 310 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1962); Kass v. Doyle, 275 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1960).
In both cases the central issue was the interpretation of "present fair equivalent value"
within § 70d(l).
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for the amount paid on the checks. The court held that section 70d(2) 94
did not protect the bank in this case, because the -bankrupt's treasurer,
who had signed the checks and had been previously authorized to do
so, had resigned his office with the bankrupt prior to the signing. The
court found that the bank, although unaware of the Treasurer's resignation, had not relied on his apparent authority to sign the checks,
and concluded that the checks were therefore not orders of the bankrupt within the meaning of section 70d(2).
The shortcomings of section 70d and the unreasonable harshness
of the lis pendens theory on which it relies were most clearly demonstrated in Bank of Matin v. England.95 Checks that the bankrupt had
issued to a creditor shortly before filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy were presented to the bank and paid in the ordinary course
of business six days after the filing. When the bank paid the checks,
it had no knowledge of the pending bankruptcy. The protection otherwise available under section 70d(2) was apparently precluded only
because the petition had been voluntary and therefore, under section
18f, resulted in an "adjudication" immediately upon filing.
Appealing from adverse decisions of the referee and the district
court, the bank presented four principal arguments against this result
to both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme CourtY6 First, the bank
contended that its payment of the checks was protected by the "negotiability proviso" in section 70d(5), as interpreted in Rosenthal v.
Guaranty Bank and Trust Co.,97 even though the payment was made

after the technical "adjudication" of the bankrupt under section 18f.
Second, it argued that under section 70a the trustee succeeded only
to the bankrupt's rights in the checking account, which under the
terms of the deposit contract were qualified by the obligation to give
the bank adequate notice to stop payment before the bank could be
held liable for paying valid outstanding checks. Third, it asserted that,
without more adequate and reasonable notice of its depositor's bankruptcy than the mere filing of a voluntary petition, it would be denied
due process of law if held liable to the trustee for payment of the
checks. Finally, it appealed to the court to grant it protection on
equitable principles regardless of the apparent effect of section 70d.
94 11 U.S.C. § llOd(2) (1964). If the checks had been validly issued, this section dearly
would have protected the bank.
95 385 U.S. 99 (1966), rev'g 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965).
96 The significance of the issues raised was underscored by the appearance of the
California Bankers Association as amicus curiae in support of the bank's position. See
352 F.2d at 187; 385 U.S. at 100.
97 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956), discussed at pp. 297-98 & notes 83-88 supra.
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The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument based on the "negotiability proviso" on two grounds. First, it held that- the proviso,, like
the protection in sections 70d(l) and (2), i limited by the opening
phrase of section 70d to the interval between the petition and adjudication, and therefore is not available in a voluntary case. Second, it
held that the proviso does not apply to presentment of a check for
payment, because such presentment is not a "negotiation" of the check
in the strict sense of the term.98 Although this issue was evidently
presented to the Supreme Court, it was dealt with only in the dissent
of Justice Harlan, who rejected the bank's argument. 99
The legislative intent behind the "negotiability proviso" is obscure, but the language "nothing in this Act shall impair . . . negotiability" appears to be opposed on its face to the Ninth Circuit's
limitation of the proviso to the interval between petition and adjudication. Further, despite the strict definition of "negotiation" in the
law of negotiable instruments, the broader provision in section 70d(5)
that "nothing ... shall impair ... negotiability" can easily be viewed
as including the indirect consequences to the normal handling of
checks prior to presentment that might result from the risks faced by
drawee banks under the Ninth Circuit's interpretation. Nevertheless,
since the Supreme Court did not deal with the applicability of the
"negotiability proviso" in this case, its precise meaning remains
obscure.
The bank's second argument, predicated on its right and duty
under the deposit contract to make payment on validly issued checks
until ordered to stop payment or given actual notice of the depositor's
bankruptcy, was rejected rather casually by the Ninth Circuit on the
dubious theory that the depositor's bankruptcy had automatically revoked the bank's authority to make payment from the account, even
with respect to the outstanding checks, and that this restriction on the
bank's authority constituted an implied exception to the deposit
contract. 100 But the bank's position on this issue was sustained by the
Supreme Court and constituted one of the principal grounds of its
decision:
[W]e do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the bankrupt's checking accounts are instantly frozen in the absence of
knowledge or notice on the part of the drawee of the bankruptcy. The trustee succeeds only to such rights as the bankrupt
possessed; and the trustee is subject to all claims and defenses
98 See the criticism of Rosenthal on this point cited note 88 supra.
99 See 385 U.S. at 104 n.2 (dissenting opinion).
100 352 F.2d at 191.
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which might have been asserted against the bankrupt but for the
filing of the petition. ... The relationship of bank and depositor
is that of debtor and creditor, founded upon contract. The bank
has the right and duty under that contract to honor checks of its
depositor properly drawn and presented . . . absent a revocation
that gives the bank notice prior to the time the checks are accepted
or paid by the bank.1° 1
At this point the Court appears to have held that the trustee, like the
bankrupt depositor, must give the bank specific directions to stop
payment on outstanding checks before the bank will be liable for
paying them, regardless of any general knowledge the bank may have
of the pendency of the bankruptcy. But this appearance is clouded
considerably by the Court's further statements, which seem to relate
equally to this issue and to the bank's third argument (concerning
the adequacy of notice to it to satisfy due process requirements).
The kind of notice required is one "reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the
pendency of the action." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., [339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)] .... We cannot say that the
act of filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy per se is reasonably calculated to put the bank on notice. Absent revocation by
the drawer or his trustee or absent knowledge or notice of the
bankruptcy by the bank, the contract between the bank and the
drawer remains unaffected by the bankruptcy and the right and
duty of the bank to pay duly presented checks remain as before.
in the checkIn such circumstances the trustee acquires no rights
102
himself.
bankrupt
the
than
greater
account
ing
It is clear from this part of the opinion that the Court has soundly
rejected the constructive notice, or lis pendens, theory of bankruptcy
adjudication when based merely on the filing of a voluntary petition.
But the Court has linked this holding with its holding sustaining the
bank's rights under the deposit contract. This was done in such a
manner that it is impossible to predict whether either ground standing
alone would be conclusive. The bank urged both grounds separately
and in conjunction, and both were evidently sustained. But the Court
did not expressly deal with the "due process" argument, nor did it
hold, as noted by Mr. Justice Harlan, that section 70d is constitutionally defective for failing to require adequate notice to third

parties.

03

101 385 U.S. at 101.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 110 (dissenting opinion). That the Court's language concerning the adequacy
of notice relates to the due process argument is suggested by, among other things, the
102

103
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The most reasonable interpretation of this combination of holdings appears to be that the bank is entitled to rely on the deposit
contract and to honor checks against the account until it receives
either a stop payment order or any actual notice of the bankruptcy.
But the Court did not hold that actual notice or knowledge of the
bankruptcy alone would terminate the bank's rights and duties under
the deposit contract. It held only that, where the bank had neither a
stop payment order nor actual notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy,
it was entitled to rely on the deposit contract, notwithstanding the
"adjudication" of the bankrupt.
Also, although the Court emphasized the necessity of notice in
this case, it did not hold that in every situation arising under section
70d third parties will be protected against the trustee unless they have
actual notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy. At best, the Court held
only that the pre-bankruptcy contract rights of a third person cannot
be altered by the bankruptcy until the third party has actual notice or
knowledge of it.
Adding substantially to these uncertainties is the disposition made
of the bank's fourth argument, that the bankruptcy court is generally
governed by equitable principles which it should invoke in a case such
as this regardless of the apparent limitations of section 70d. The difficulty of the bank's position in the absence of such relief was well
described by the Ninth Circuit:
Under the trustee's theory of the case the bank must, in order
to avoid liability, keep itself informed of the possibility of bankruptcy proceedings involving a depositor. According to the bank,
this will require it to keep advised momentarily of bankruptcy
filings. This burden is enhanced by the fact that filing in any
district court in the United States will have the same effect. The
steps demanded for protection are cited as impractical and otherwise burdensome.
Court's reliance on Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950),
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), and Walter v. City of Hutchinson, 352
U.S. 112 (1956), none of which were bankruptcy or bank deposit cases, but all of which
dealt with the adequacy of notice under the requirements of due process. The Ninth
Circuit rejected the bank's "due process" argument on the theory that prior to the turnover
proceeding "the rights of the bank were not affected by any order entered by the
referee" (352 F.2d at 192), notwithstanding the fact that the bank's liability was based
solely on the "adjudication" of the bankrupt upon filing the voluntary petition. It is
difficult to reconcile this holding with the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the bank's second
argument, holding that the filing of the bankruptcy petition automatically terminated the
bank's right to honor valid checks as an exception to the deposit contract. The filing of the
petition should be regarded as affecting or as not affecting the* bank's rights and liabilities for all purposes.
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The bank's dilemma is real since it is under a duty to depositors to honor checks which are validly drawn; at the same time
there is always the possibility that the depositor, without the knowledge of the bank, has become the subject of bankruptcy proceedings. The hardship to the bank of keeping itself apprised of developments in the bankruptcy court is contrasted with the relatively
light burden that a notice requirement would place upon the
trustee. The trustee or receiver, upon filing, is informed of the
bankrupt's accounts and deposits; and notification by him to the
10 4
bank would be relatively simple.
Nevertheless, adhering to the strict interpretation of section 70d
adopted in the earlier cases, the court rejected the bank's appeal for
the application of "equitable principles" to extend protection to it
beyond that in section 70d.
The Supreme Court rejected the strict interpretation of section
70d and the trustee's argument based on the prohibition expressed in
section 70d(5).
Yet we do not read these statutory words with the ease of a
computer. There is an overriding consideration that equitable
principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction.... We
have said enough to indicate why it would be inequitable to hold
liable a drawee who pays checks of the bankrupt duly drawn but
presented after bankruptcy, where no actual revocation of its
authority has been made and it has no notice or knowledge of
the bankruptcy. The force of §§ 70d(5) and 18f can be maintained by imposing liability on the payee of the checks where he
has received a voidable preference or other voidable transfer.
The payee is a creditor of the bankrupt, and to make it reimburse
the trustee is only to deprive it of preferential treatment and to
restore it to the category of a general creditor. To permit the
trustee under these circumstances to obtain recovery only against
the party that benefited from the transaction is to do equity 0 5
The dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan deals principally with the
problems posed by the Court's reliance on "equitable principles" contrary to the provisions of section 70d. Although he recognizes that the
result reached by the Court does "alleviate an indisputable inequity
to the bank," he would nevertheless affirm the decision for the trustee
on the basis of the proscription in section 70d(5). He concludes:
I had thought it well settled that equity may supplement, but
may never supersede, the Act .... The Act's language is neither
imprecise nor infelicitous; I can therefore see no room for the
interposition of equity. 1 5
104 352 F.2d at 190.
105 385 U.S. at 103.
106 Id. at 110 (dissenting opinion).
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The dilemma faced by the Court and the solution reached demonstrate the inadequacy of section 70d in its present form and suggest
the manner in which it should be amended. But in the absence of
an amendment, the Court's opinion leaves the future interpretation
and application of section 70d and the principles governing postbankruptcy transfers in serious uncertainty.
The Court's final holding, based on "equitable principles" notwithstanding the apparent exclusiveness of section 70d, presents two
basic difficulties. First, if a court may now grant protection beyond
the limitation of section 70d on the basis of "equitable principles,"
it would appear to be equally able to deny protection on the same
basis, despite the provisions of section 70d. If so, the matter of postbankruptcy transfers may have returned to the pre-1938 pattern of
applying judicial discretion to each case, with the attendant unpredictability, risk, and uncertainty that existed then. Second, the Court's
opinion fails to clarify the relationship between the third holding,
based on "equitable principles," and the first two holdings, based respectively on the bank's rights under the deposit contract and on the
lack of adequate notice. Each of these grounds alone might have been
sufficient to support the decision. But the Court did not hold that each,
or any one of them, was alone decisive without the aid of the others.
Nor did it reject such possibility. It held only that the three grounds
together supported its conclusion.
V
TiH

NEED FOR AMENDMENT-AND

A PROPOSAL

These developments demonstrate that an amendment of section
70d is necessary for three basic reasons. First, it is as true today as it
was when sections 70d and 21g were adopted in 1988 that the matter
of post-bankruptcy transfers should be governed exclusively by adequate statutory provision rather than by the uncertain application of
"equitable principles." Second, although section 70d was well drafted
in many respects, the narrow limitations it imposes on the protected
interval produce unreasonably harsh results. Third, in an effort to
avoid such harshness, the Supreme Court's opinion in Bank of Matin
v. England has left the future significance of section 70d in serious
question without providing in its place any clear guide for future decisions.
Section 70d has four functional parts: (a) the denial in clause (5)
of protection except as specified in sections 70d and 21g; (b) the basic
grant of protection to the two types of post-bankruptcy transfers de-
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scribed in clauses (1) and (2); (c) the "negotiability proviso" in clause
(5); and (d) the dual limitations on the protected interval expressed in
the opening phrase of section 70d and in clause (4).
The first of these components is clearly necessary in any attempt
to govern the subject of post-bankruptcy transfers exclusively by statute. Clauses (1) and (2), defining the two basic types of protected postbankruptcy transfers, have proven to be sound and well drafted. 10 7 By
employing the key terms "good faith" and "present fair equivalent
value," they limit their protection to those persons whose post-bankruptcy transactions with the bankrupt do not diminish the bankruptcy
estate and who in most cases act without knowledge of the bankruptcy.
Such persons should be protected against the trustee's claim, and those
not deserving protection are excluded by necessary implication.
The critical term "good faith" is not adequately defined in section
70d. Clause (3) indicates that in most cases the term means only the
absence of actual knowledge of the bankruptcy. But the possibility that
it means something more than this is not foreclosed. Also, the qualification on the usual meaning of "good faith"-that a person knowing of
the bankruptcy may still be in "good faith" if "he has reasonable cause
to believe that the petition in bankruptcy is not well founded"'10 8seems inappropriate in section 70d. The intended purpose of this provision-to protect businesses from harassment by unfounded involuntary petitions--could be accomplished more effectively in a separate
provision designed specifically to meet that problem, which is extraneous to the matter of post-bankruptcy transfers. It also seems unlikely
that anyone with actual knowledge of the bankruptcy and the trustee's
rights will intentionally continue to deal with the bankrupt, or will
extend credit to him, merely on the strength of his ability to prove in
future litigation with the trustee that he had reasonable cause to believe the petition was not well founded. The problems affecting postbankruptcy transfers would be reduced by defining the term "good
faith" for all purposes as the absence of actual knowledge of the pendency of the bankruptcy.
The scope and intended purpose of the "negotiability proviso"
remain obscure. The broad interpretation of this provision in Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank and Trust Co. 10 9 has been criticized on the
ground that presentment of a check for payment is not a "negotiation"
107

See, e.g., Schilling v. McAllister Bros., 310 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1962); Kass v. Doyle,

275 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1960).
108 Bankruptcy Act § 70d(3), 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110d(3) (1964).
109 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956).
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in the strict sense. 110 Nevertheless, the language "nothing . . . shall
impair the negotiability of,. . . negotiable instruments" does not re-

quire such strict interpretation. In any event, the intended meaning
of this provision should be clarified.
The principal defect in section 70d, which has produced most of
the litigation under that section, and which dictates the urgency of
amendment, is that the availability of protection to third persons under clauses (1) and (2) is severely limited by the opening phrase of
section 70d and by clause (4) to the interval between the filing of the
petition and the earlier of adjudication or possession of the bankrupt's
property by a receiver. If either of these two terminal events has occurred, section 70d purports to prohibit protection to the third person,
even though he participates in good faith in a transaction squarely
within clause (1) or (2) in all other respects. The earlier cases accepted
the statutory command with its unreasonably harsh consequences."'
Rosenthal avoided its effect through reliance on the "negotiability
proviso.""

2

The Supreme Court in Bank of Matin v. England found

113
it unacceptable and refused to obey it.
The legislative history of section 70d indicates that the provisions
limiting the protected interval were not based on any carefully considered policy to deny protection in the transactions described in clauses
(1) and (2) after either of the two terminal events. Instead, the limitations resulted only from a general effort to conform the new section
to the pattern of the existing case law. The case law in question concerned the relation-back rule and its exceptions, all of which, because
of the structure of the internal ambiguity in section 70a, related to the
interval between filing the petition and adjudication. For this reason
the case law was interpreted as limiting protection for post-petition
transfers to the pre-adjudication period, although in two cases postadjudication transfers had been protected. 114 None of the cases, however, held that protection could not be granted to an innocent third
person after adjudication, nor did any of them seriously consider the
question.
110 See note 88 supra.
111 Feldman v. Capitol Piece Dye Works, Inc., 293 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

368 US. 948 (1961); Kohn v. Myers, 266 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1959), aff'g In re Autocue Sales
& Distrib. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 218
F.2d 394 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955).
112 Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956).
113 Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
114 The two cases were Frederick v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 US. 395 (1921),
and Jones v. Springer, 226 U.S. 148 (1912). But cf. J.S. & J.F. String, Inc. v. Birkhahn,
30 F.2d 492 (3d Cir. 1929); Southern Ry.v. Cole, 49 Ga. App. 635, 176 S.E. 512 (1934).
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When Congress amended section 70a in 1938 to eliminate the internal ambiguity, it put an end to the need for the relation-back rule
and to the significance of the interval between the petition and adjudication. The ill-considered inclusion at that time of the provision in
section 70d ending the protected interval on the adjudication of the
bankrupt-ostensibly to conform to the pattern of prior case law-was
actually the perpetuation of an anachronism that had never been directly passed on in the prior cases.
The provisions in section 70d that end the protected interval
when a receiver has taken possession of the bankrupt's property were
also derived from indications in the earlier cases, rather than from an
independent consideration of the merits of the limitation itself. Innocent purchasers for value in the ordinary course of the bankrupt's business had been protected against the relation-back rule, if they had purchased while an involuntary petition was pending and prior to a
receiver's taking possession of the business. 115 But these cases granted
protection where no receiver was in possession; they did not deny protection where a receiver had taken possession. There appear to have
been no cases of the latter sort. Thus, this feature of section 70d also
perpetuated a rule suggested, but not actually decided, by the earlier
cases.
The principle reflected in the use of these two events in section
70d for terminating the protected interval is that either event is of sufficient public notoriety to constitute constructive notice of the bankruptcy to any third person who may become involved in a post-bankruptcy transaction. Essentially, this is a form of the principle of lis
pendens, by which everyone dealing with property involved in pending litigation is deemed constructively on notice of the litigation and
its outcome.116 The doctrine of lis pendens, however, is usually applicable only to suits involving title to specifically identified real property
and is restricted by a requirement that a notice of the suit be filed in
the appropriate public land records. "1 7
Even subject to these limitations lis pendens is usually regarded
as a harsh principle, the use of which should be limited to those situations in which it has become customary and should be coupled with
115 Hersh v. United States, 68 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1934); In re Retail Stores Delivery
Corp., 11 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); In re Latex Drilling Co., 11 F.2d 373 (W.D. La.
1926). See also In re Mertens, 144 F. 818 (2d Cir. 1906).
116 ANALYSIs or H.R. 12889, supra note 52, at 229-31; McLaughlin, supra note 36, at
612-14.
117 See, e.g., Halley v. Ano, 136 N.Y. 569, 575-76, 82 N.E. 1068, 1068-70 (1898) (requirements not met and doctrine held inapplicable); McLaughlin, supra note 36, at 613.
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a requirement to give effective public notice of the suit beyond the
mere records of the court."18 Section 70d, however, is concerned only
with personal property, including intangible property, which is often
involved in rapidly moving commercial transactions. The section contains no provision for giving effective public notice of the litigation
beyond the records of the court. Since a bankruptcy petition can be
filed effectively in any district in the United States, 119 and since commercial transactions today are frequently handled at high speed across
great distances, it is obvious that the principle of lis pendens has been
pushed beyond all reasonable bounds in section 70d.
Adding to the difficulties created by use of the lis pendens principle in section 70d is the 1959 amendment of section 18f to provide
that "[t]he filing of a voluntary petition ... shall operate as an adjudi120
cation with the same force and effect as a decree of adjudication."'
Given literal effect, this provision inevitably eliminates any interval
between the filing of the petition and adjudication, and thereby eliminates, in voluntary proceedings, all protection for the transactions
described in clauses (1) and (2). There is no indication in the legislative history of the 1959 amendment that Congress intended to
achieve this result. Rather, the amendment was evidently intended
solely for administrative simplification and efficiency. Since it has
worked well toward that end, the problem it creates for protection of
post-bankruptcy transfers should be cured by amendment of section
70d rather than by any change in section 18f. There appears to be no
valid reason for distinguishing between the rights of innocent third
persons in voluntary cases and their rights in involuntary cases. 121 The
type of petition that initiated the proceeding is immaterial from the
standpoint of an innocent third person.
For a third person to come within clause (1)or clause (2) of section 70d, he must give value or its equivalent, and in most cases he
118 McLaughlin,

supra note 36, at 612-14.
119 Bankruptcy Act §§ 2a(1), 82b-c, 11 U.S.C. §§ lla(1), 55(b)-(c) (1964), provide, in
effect, that cases filed in the wrong district are misfiled as to venue only and may be
transferred to the appropriate district. Thus, a petition filed in the wrong district is
nevertheless within the court's jurisdiction subject to a change of venue, and the filing
establishes both the date of bankruptcy, and, if the petition is voluntary, the adjudication, even though the case may subsequently be transferred across the continent.
120 73 Stat. 109 (1959), 11 U.S.C. § 41(f) (1964).
121 Mr. Justice Harlan suggests that § 70d may have been intended only for involuntary proceedings. 585 U.S. at 108-09 (dissenting opinion). The legislative history of 70d,
however, does not require such inference. Nor does the distinction between voluntary and
involuntary proceedings appear to have any logical relevance to the rights of innocent
third persons.
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must act without any actual knowledge of the bankruptcy. Therefore,
both events that terminate the availability of protection-the bankrupt's adjudication and a receiver's possession of some of his property
-are necessarily unrelated to the third person's practical situation
and conduct, and their use to deny him protection is essentially arbitrary. The effect of this feature of section 70d is to benefit the creditors of the estate-most of whom voluntarily extended credit to the
bankrupt prior to bankruptcy after calculating the risk-at the expense of the innocent third person who has no opportunity to protect
122
himself. This result is difficult to justify.
Based on these considerations and on the implications of the
holding in Bank of Matin v. England that, "before a person is deprived of property" by the pendency of litigation, he must be given
notice "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
[him] of the pendency of the action,"'123 it is submitted that section
70d should be amended (1) to delete both of the present limitations
on the interval during which protection is possible, and (2) to extend
the protected interval until the earlier of (a) actual notification to
third persons of the pendency of the bankruptcy, or (b) actual possession of the property in question by a receiver or trustee. These
changes would eliminate the questionable use of the doctrine of lis
pendens in this context and would help to bring this facet of the
Bankruptcy Act into closer harmony with the realities of contemporary
commercial life. The proposed amendment would also remove the
uncertainties left by the Supreme Court's resort to "equitable principles" in Bank of Marin v. England by restoring the matter of postbankruptcy transfers to the exclusive control of the statute.
This proposal does not actually suggest any startling innovation
in bankruptcy administration. In the present Act innocent third persons involved in post-bankruptcy transfers of real estate situated beyond the county in which the bankruptcy is pending are protected
under section 21g unless a document giving notice of the bankruptcy
has been filed in the appropriate public land records. The availability
of this protection does not end with adjudication of the bankrupt or
with possession of his other property by a receiver. It ends only when
122 J. MAcLAcHLAN, supra note 55, § 293, at 346, suggests that the limitation is designed to inhibit further "meddling" with the estate and is proper because the bankrupt
is no longer entitled to special consideration. But the person whose interests are actually
at stake is the innocent third person who in "good faith" gives present value and can
scarcely be said to be "meddling" with the estate.
128 385 U.S. at 102, .quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950).
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the necessary document is properly filed. The absence of litigation
under section 21g since its adoption in 1938, in contrast to the experience under section 70d, is evidence of the soundness and workability
of the section 21g approach.
Further precedent for the suggested amendment of section 70d is
found in the 1867 Act, which required both publication of notices in
newspapers selected by the court or the marshal and actual written
notification of scheduled creditors and other interested persons. These
notices advised of the pendency of the bankruptcy and gave specific
warning against post-bankruptcy transfers. The present proposal is
similar to these provisions.
In amending section 70d to provide for affirmative notification
of third persons who might become involved in post-bankruptcy transactions, it is necessary to distinguish between two groups of persons.
Persons indebted to the bankrupt or holding property of the bankrupt
when the petition is filed can be individually identified without difficulty and should be fully disclosed in the schedules filed by the
bankrupt. These persons can and should be individually notified of
the pendency of the bankruptcy. As under section 21g, it should be permissible for this to be done by the bankrupt, a receiver, the trustee,
the referee, or any creditor at any time after the petition is filed, and
it should be sufficient if effected by delivery of a copy of the petition
or by such other means as the court may direct. This would place no
more burden on the court and its officers than notification of scheduled
creditors does now.
The second group consists of persons who may become innocent
transferees for value within clause (1) of section 70d. These persons
cannot be identified in advance and therefore cannot be individually
notified. Their situation would be materially improved, however, and
the likelihood of their becoming involved in transactions within clause
(1) reduced, by a requirement that notice of the bankruptcy be published, as directed by the court, in appropriate newspapers both where
the bankrupt's property is located and where the bankruptcy is pending, and that the public be notified of the bankruptcy in such other
manner as the court directs. Although any form of general public
notice is necessarily imperfect, this suggestion would give the pendency of the bankruptcy substantially greater notoriety than it now
receives and as much as the circumstances appear to permit. This provision should also permit the public notice to be given by any interested party at any time after the petition is filed.
The proposed change would not expose an estate to post-
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bankruptcy transfers indefinitely. At any time a receiver or trustee,
a creditor, or the court could act promptly to give effective notification
to third persons. Also a receiver or trustee could promptly take possession of all the bankrupt's property. Either event would prevent
further post-bankruptcy transactions within clauses (1) and (2) of
section 70d. But until one of these events has taken place, innocent
third persons would be protected in transactions within clauses (1)
and (2). This would remedy the most serious shortcomings of the
present section 70d and would assure that third persons would receive
notice of the bankruptcy "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise them of the pendency of the action" 124 before being
adversely affected by it. This being assured, the matter of postbankruptcy transfers could be restored to the exclusive regulation of
25

the statute.1

124 Id.
125 As a corollary to the proposed amendment to § 70d, § 21g should be amended

to delete the exception to the notice recording requirement that now exists with respect
to land in the county where the bankruptcy is pending. The general notice recording
requirement as to all other land has worked well. There seems to be little justification
for not making this reasonable provision uniformly applicable to all realty. The exception is based essentially on the lispendens doctrine. Although that doctrine is more
customary in the real property context, its operation is harsh unless coupled with a
notice recording requirement. Though less urgent than amendment of § 70d, this suggestion is equally appropriate to making the law governing post-bankruptcy transfers
more reasonable and uniform.

